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TURKEY, CYPRUS AND NORTHERN CYPRUS : The Island That Divided the Mediterranean

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By Nkem Anyata-Lafia

There are places on the world map whose size bears little resemblance to their importance.

Cyprus is one such place.

Against the backdrop of the fatal ferry accident over the weekend, Cyprus, Turkey and Northern Cyprus and their distinct geopolitics are again taking the centrestage of global discourses.

Cyprus is a relatively small island in the Eastern Mediterranean, which has for centuries attracted the ambitions of empires, kings, military powers and modern states. Its location—at the meeting point of Europe, Asia and Africa—has made it strategically valuable far beyond its geographical dimensions.

Today, the island remains divided between the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus in the south and a Turkish Cypriot administration in the north, which declared itself the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983 and is recognised as a state only by Turkey. The division, rooted in competing national aspirations and sharpened by the dramatic events of 1974, remains one of the Mediterranean’s most enduring geopolitical disputes.

AN ISLAND AT THE CROSSROADS OF CIVILISATIONS

Cyprus has rarely been left alone by history.

Its strategic position brought successive rulers and powers to its shores. Over the centuries, the island passed through the influence or control of major civilisations, including the Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Crusaders, Venetians and Ottomans.

The modern geopolitical story of Cyprus, however, cannot be understood without appreciating the importance of the Ottoman Empire.

In 1571, Ottoman forces captured Cyprus from Venice. Ottoman rule lasted until the late nineteenth century and helped establish the Turkish Muslim community whose descendants became the Turkish Cypriots of today. The island’s Greek Orthodox majority, meanwhile, retained its own cultural, religious and linguistic identity.

Thus, two major communities developed on the same island—linked by geography but increasingly connected, culturally and politically, to two different motherlands: Greece and Turkey.

BRITAIN ARRIVES, NATIONALISM AWAKENS

In 1878, Britain assumed administration of Cyprus, beginning a new chapter in the island’s political history.

British rule introduced new institutions and administrative structures, but it also coincided with the growth of modern nationalism.

Among many Greek Cypriots, the great political aspiration became known as Enosis—the union of Cyprus with Greece.

To its supporters, Enosis represented national self-determination and the fulfilment of the island’s Greek cultural identity.

But the idea produced deep anxiety among Turkish Cypriots.

If Cyprus joined Greece, what would become of the Turkish Cypriot minority?

This question gradually produced a competing political idea: Taksim, or partition.

Where Greek Cypriot nationalists increasingly spoke of union, many Turkish Cypriots increasingly demanded guarantees, autonomy or territorial separation.

The seeds of the modern Cyprus conflict were taking root.

INDEPENDENCE—BUT NOT PEACE

Cyprus gained independence from Britain in 1960.

The new Republic of Cyprus was built upon a complicated constitutional arrangement designed to balance the interests of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom became guarantor powers under the 1960 arrangements, with responsibilities connected to the constitutional order and independence of the new state.

But the arrangement proved fragile.

Disagreements over power-sharing and constitutional changes soon generated serious political tensions. Intercommunal violence intensified during the early 1960s.

In 1964, the United Nations established the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, known as UNFICYP, to help prevent further fighting and restore normal conditions. More than six decades later, the Cyprus question remains on the international agenda, and the UN’s presence continues to symbolise the unfinished nature of the conflict.

1974: THE YEAR THAT CHANGED EVERYTHING

If one year stands above all others in the modern history of Cyprus, it is 1974.

On 15 July, a coup was staged against Cyprus’s President, Archbishop Makarios III. The coup involved the Cypriot National Guard under the direction of Greek officers and was connected to the political climate created by the military junta then ruling Greece.

The coup raised fears that Cyprus could be pushed towards Enosis (alliance with Greece).

Five days later, on 20 July 1974, Turkey launched a major military operation in Cyprus, invoking its interpretation of its rights and responsibilities under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.

From that moment, the narratives sharply diverged.

Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side maintain that the intervention was necessary to protect Turkish Cypriots and prevent the annexation of Cyprus by Greece.

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and many international actors regard the military operation and the continuing Turkish military presence as an invasion and occupation.

The United Nations Security Council immediately became involved, calling for a ceasefire, an end to foreign military intervention and negotiations aimed at restoring peace and constitutional government.

The fighting and subsequent military developments fundamentally transformed the island.

By August 1974, Turkish forces controlled roughly the northern third of Cyprus. Large-scale population movements followed, with many Greek Cypriots moving south and many Turkish Cypriots moving north.

The island had become, in practical terms, divided.

THE GREEN LINE: A BORDER THROUGH A NATION

The ceasefire lines that emerged after the conflict became the basis of the United Nations buffer zone, popularly known as the Green Line.

The line cuts across Cyprus and divides its capital, Nicosia.

On one side lies the area effectively administered by the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus.

On the other lies the Turkish Cypriot-administered north.

The division is not merely geographical.

It has affected homes, families, properties, businesses, politics and personal identities for generations.

For decades, the Green Line represented one of the most visible examples of a divided territory in the modern world.

THE BIRTH OF NORTHERN CYPRUS

The Turkish Cypriot administration went through several political transformations following the events of 1974.

In 1975, the Turkish Cypriot leadership established the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, envisaged by its supporters as a step towards a future federal settlement.

But negotiations failed to produce a permanent agreement.

Then, on 15 November 1983, the Turkish Cypriot leadership declared the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Turkey recognised the new entity.

The rest of the international community did not.

The United Nations Security Council regarded the unilateral declaration as legally invalid and called upon states not to recognise it.

That remains the central diplomatic reality today: Northern Cyprus functions as a separate administration in practice, but it does not enjoy broad international recognition as a sovereign state.

TURKEY’S STRATEGIC STAKE

For Turkey, Cyprus is much more than an issue of historical memory.

The island lies close to Turkey’s southern coast and occupies an important position in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Ankara sees the security and political status of Turkish Cypriots as a matter of national importance.

Turkey also regards its relationship with Northern Cyprus as strategically essential.

This is partly explained by geography.

Control and influence in Cyprus affect the wider balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean—a region that links the Middle East, North Africa and Europe.

It is also an area increasingly associated with disputes over:

Maritime boundaries;

Offshore natural gas;

Exclusive economic zones;

Energy pipelines;

Naval power and military access.

The discovery and exploration of energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean have, therefore, added a new dimension to an already complicated historical dispute.

GREECE, TURKEY AND AN OLD RIVALRY

The Cyprus problem cannot be separated entirely from the wider relationship between Turkey and Greece.

The two countries are both members of NATO, yet they have historically experienced tensions over several strategic questions.

These include:

Cyprus;

The Aegean Sea;

Territorial waters;

Airspace;

Maritime boundaries;

Islands and sovereignty;

Energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Cyprus is,therefore,part of a larger geopolitical equation.

A crisis on the island can influence relations between Ankara and Athens, and because both countries are significant military powers, their disagreements often attract the attention of NATO, the European Union and the United States.

THE EUROPEAN UNION CHANGES THE EQUATION

In 2004, the Republic of Cyprus became a member of the European Union.

This development introduced another important geopolitical dimension.

The internationally recognised government in Nicosia now participates in European institutions and has a voice in the political decisions of the European Union.

Northern Cyprus, however, remains outside the effective application of EU law under the island’s unresolved political circumstances.

Cyprus’s membership has also complicated Turkey’s long relationship with the European Union.

The Cyprus question has become intertwined with broader discussions about Turkey’s European aspirations, regional security and relations between Ankara and Brussels.

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE

For more than half a century, diplomats have tried to find a formula capable of ending the division.

The United Nations has traditionally supported negotiations aimed at establishing a bizonal, bicommunal political settlement.

For many years, the preferred international framework centred on some form of federal partnership between the two communities.

One of the most ambitious attempts came with the Annan Plan in 2004;named after Kofi Anan of the then United Nations leadership.

The proposal was submitted separately to Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot voters.

The Turkish Cypriot electorate approved the plan, while the Greek Cypriot electorate rejected it.

The opportunity for reunification was lost.

Since then, negotiations have continued intermittently, but fundamental disagreements have remained.

The central questions are difficult:
Should Cyprus become one united federal state?

Or should the political reality of two separate administrations lead eventually to a two-state solution?

TWO VISIONS, ONE ISLAND

Today, the Cyprus problem is essentially caught between two competing visions.

THE FEDERAL VISION

The internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus and many international actors continue to favour a negotiated settlement based on a united island with two constituent communities sharing power under an agreed federal structure.

The argument is that Cyprus must be reunited rather than permanently partitioned.

THE TWO-STATE VISION

Turkey and many Turkish Cypriot leaders have increasingly argued that decades of unsuccessful negotiations have demonstrated the need for a different approach.

Their emphasis has shifted towards the recognition of the sovereign equality of the Turkish Cypriot side and the possibility of two separate states cooperating with one another.

Between these two positions lies the great diplomatic deadlock.

A SMALL ISLAND, A BIG GEOPOLITICAL QUESTION

Cyprus demonstrates one of the great truths of international politics: geography can make even a small territory enormously important.

The island stands close to the Middle East.

It overlooks important Mediterranean sea routes.

It lies within reach of the Suez route and the wider North African and Levantine regions.

Its political future affects the interests of:

Turkey;

Greece;

The Republic of Cyprus;

Turkish Cypriots;

The European Union;

The United Kingdom;

NATO;

The United Nations;

And increasingly, regional energy powers.

This is why the Cyprus problem has endured.

It is not simply a dispute over land.

It is a conflict involving identity, history, sovereignty, security, international law and geopolitical influence.

THE ROAD AHEAD

More than five decades after the events of 1974, Cyprus remains divided.

There has been no return to full-scale war, and the United Nations buffer zone has helped preserve an uneasy peace.

Crossing points have also enabled greater movement and contact between the two sides than was possible during the early decades of division.

Yet the political settlement remains elusive.

For Greek Cypriots, the continued division represents an unresolved national tragedy and a question of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

For Turkish Cypriots, political equality and security remain central concerns.

For Turkey, Cyprus remains a vital strategic and national-security issue.

For Greece, the island continues to occupy an important place in the wider relationship with Ankara.

And for the international community, Cyprus
remains a reminder that conflicts rooted in history are rarely solved by geography alone.

THE FINAL WORD

The geopolitical history of Turkey, Cyprus and Northern Cyprus is, ultimately, the story of an island caught between continents and competing national dreams.

The Ottoman conquest of 1571, British administration beginning in 1878, independence in 1960, intercommunal conflict in the 1960s, the dramatic crisis of 1974, and the declaration of Northern Cyprus in 1983 are not isolated chapters.

They form one continuing story.

A story of two communities.

Two powerful neighbouring nations.

Two sharply different visions of sovereignty.

And one strategically important island still searching for a political future that both sides can accept.

Cyprus may be a small dot on the Mediterranean map, but its history has made it one of the world’s most consequential geopolitical fault lines.

Anyata-Lafia,Journalist and Development Expert,is a graduate student of International Relations.He wrote in from Abuja

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China-Africa Cooperation: Tackling Insecurity Through Development

Lt. Gen. Abdulrahman B. Dambazau (rtd), PhD, CFR, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the People’s Republic of China.

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By Lt. Gen. Abdulrahman B. Dambazau (rtd), PhD, CFR


A farmer who cannot safely reach his land, a child whose school has closed because of violence, and a young graduate unable to find productive employment experience insecurity in different ways.

Their circumstances reveal a common challenge: lasting peace requires protection from violence and the opportunity to live with dignity. This connection should occupy a central place in China–Africa cooperation.


My experience in military leadership, internal security and diplomacy has reinforced my conviction that security operations must form part of a broader national effort. Armed forces and law enforcement agencies have indispensable responsibilities to protect communities, confront violent groups and uphold the law.

The gains they secure become durable when legitimate institutions, functioning services and economic opportunities take root.


Development is therefore a strategic component of security. Where communities can farm, trade, learn and obtain justice, they have stronger foundations for resisting the pressures that sustain violence.


Poverty does not automatically produce terrorism or criminality. Millions endure hardship without turning to violence. Insecurity also arises from political exclusion, contested resources, extremist ideologies, organised crime and institutional weakness. Nevertheless, prolonged deprivation and a lack of credible opportunities can create vulnerabilities that violent actors exploit.

Effective policy must address both those actors and the conditions that enable their influence.
China–Africa cooperation offers a framework for advancing this approach. The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation’s Beijing Action Plan for 2025–2027 brings peace and security into the same programme as industrialisation, agriculture, infrastructure, education, public health and green development. Its significance lies in the opportunity to connect these fields through practical implementation.


China’s development experience provides useful lessons. A joint study by the World Bank and Chinese institutions reported in 2022 that, over the preceding four decades, the number of people in China living below the international extreme-poverty line then in use had fallen by close to 800 million.

The study emphasised economic transformation alongside targeted poverty reduction measures. African countries can examine how agricultural productivity, infrastructure, education and employment expanded opportunity, while adapting relevant lessons to their own circumstances.


Africa’s countries have distinct histories, political systems and development priorities. Cooperation will achieve more when African governments define their needs clearly and negotiate partnerships that strengthen domestic capabilities. African ownership must guide project selection, implementation and assessment.


Agriculture should be an immediate priority. In communities affected by insecurity, restoring farming and rural commerce can support recovery and stability. Cooperation in irrigation, improved seeds, machinery, storage, processing and extension services can raise productivity and strengthen livelihoods. Investment should be accompanied by secure access to land, fair arrangements for managing water and grazing resources, and credible mechanisms for resolving disputes.


A processing facility has greater value when farmers can reach it safely, receive fair payment and access wider markets. Communities emerging from violence also need assistance that enables displaced families to return voluntarily, safely and with dignity, and rebuild sustainable livelihoods. Development planning and security planning must meet at this practical level.


Reliable electricity and productive industry are equally important. Power supply enables workshops, factories, health facilities and digital enterprises to function. Industrial cooperation should create opportunities for African workers, suppliers and entrepreneurs, with clear provisions for skills transfer and the maintenance of equipment and facilities.


Young people need realistic pathways from education to work. Technical training should connect to actual demand in manufacturing, construction, agriculture, logistics and technology. Programmes should be assessed by the capabilities and employment they produce. Partnerships between training institutions and employers can help ensure that qualifications lead to productive work.


Infrastructure must be judged by the economic activity and public services it enables. A railway, road or port can support national integration and trade, but its wider benefits depend on connections to local production and affordable access. Project planning must account for maintenance, environmental protection, community interests and financial sustainability. Financing arrangements should be transparent, with repayment obligations assessed against realistic economic returns and public resources.
Education and health deserve the same strategic attention.

Schools help communities recover continuity and hope after disruption. Accessible healthcare reduces household vulnerability and strengthens confidence in public institutions. Cooperation among universities, research centres, hospitals and technical colleges can build the expertise African countries need to sustain these services.


Women must participate fully in this work. Their livelihoods, access to services and involvement in local decision-making matter to household resilience and community recovery. Programmes designed without their participation risk overlooking essential needs and sources of knowledge.


Development cannot compensate for injustice. Communities require fair policing, accessible courts, accountable administration and protection from abuse. A school or clinic will contribute more to lasting stability where citizens also trust public institutions to treat them fairly. Economic investment and institutional reform should proceed together.


Security cooperation should reinforce these foundations. Professional training, peacekeeping capacity, maritime security, action against illicit arms and stronger responses to organised crime can help protect development gains.

Such cooperation should uphold national law, human rights and accountability. Its ultimate purpose must be the safety of people and the strengthening of legitimate institutions.
For Nigeria, the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership established during President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s September 2024 visit to China provides a framework for pursuing these objectives. It offers an opportunity to connect bilateral cooperation more closely with Nigeria’s priorities for economic transformation and national security.


The next task is disciplined implementation. Every major commitment should have an identified responsible institution, a financing arrangement, a timetable and measurable outcomes. Proposed projects, signed agreements, funds disbursed and completed investments represent different stages of progress. Public reporting should make those distinctions clear.


We should ask practical questions. Has an agricultural project improved farmers’ incomes? Has an industrial investment created sustainable employment and developed local suppliers? Has training transferred skills that institutions can retain? Have communities affected by conflict gained safer access to schools, healthcare and markets?


These questions should guide the assessment of cooperation. They also require African governments to fulfil their own responsibilities: coordinating institutions, protecting public resources, maintaining infrastructure and ensuring that investment benefits communities fairly. Regional cooperation is essential where trade routes, shared resources and security threats cross national borders.


China–Africa cooperation can contribute substantially to peace when development expands opportunity, institutions earn public trust and security agencies protect citizens effectively. Its lasting achievement should be visible in ordinary lives: farmers returning safely to their fields, young people securing worthwhile work and children remaining in school. These are the foundations on which a more secure Africa can be built.


_Abdulrahman B. Dambazau is a retired Lieutenant General, former Chief of Army Staff and former Minister of Interior. He is currently the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the People’s Republic of China. He writes from Beijing, China._

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